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The Reach of the SEC Under Rule 10b-5 Is Further
Restricted: Negligent Conduct Is Insufficient to
Warrant Commission Instigated Injunctive Relief
In a recent decision the United States District Court for the
Sourthern District of New York seemingly broke with Second
Circuit precedent to hold that the SEC must prove scienter to get
an injunction under Rule lOb-5. The author suggests that the
district court's decision is reconcilable with recent second Circuit
decisions and presents reasons why the district court's holding
should be adopted by the Second Circuit.
Bausch & Lomb is one of the country's leading manufacturers
of optical products. In the latter part of 1971 and the early part of
1972, the company excited considerable investor interest because of
its introduction into the market of a soft contact lens. Its earnings
per share increased dramatically. Securities analysts paid close at-
tention to the company during this period, especially when informa-
tion adverse to the continued high performance of its stock became
known. An interchange between the chairman of the board of
Bausch & Lomb and an analyst had resulted in the disclousre of
material inside information (earnings estimates) before it was pub-
licly disseminated. However, shortly after divulging the earnings
estimates to the analyst, the chairman had relayed to a leading
financial analyst the same information in expectation that it would
be published. He took further steps to insure public dissemination
of the data, including the issuance two days later of a formal press
release requested by the New York Stock Exchange. No insider
trading occurred. The Securities Exchange Commission sought to
pemanently enjoin Bausch & Lomb and its chief executive officer
from violations of section 78 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,1 and Rule 10b-52 promulgated under its aegis. The United
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
It shall. be unlawful for any person, directly, or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
1524 [Vol. 31:1524
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York held:.
The officer's acts belie any intent to deceive. The SEC must plead
and prove scienter in -an injunctive action under Rule 10b-5 even
where no damages are sought. SEC v. Baasch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F.
Supp, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The court, per Judget Ward, asserted that its holding was com-
pelled by the rationale of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,4 a Supreme
Court decision rendered during the course of the Bausch & Lomb
trial. By its ruling the district court has significantly extended the
reach of Hochfelder. In doing so, the court also has run into direct
conflict with other holdings in its own circuit,5 as well as decisions
in other circuits.
While the Second Circuit has long accepted the position taken
by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder-that some form of scienter
is a requisite element in a private action for damages under Rule
10b-5 7-- it has consistently iuled that policy considerations underly-
ing SEC enforcement actions dictate a contrary conclusion.' Injunc-
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
3. The court also found no reasonable likelihood that the acts would be repeated. This'
too mitigated the basis for issuance of the injunction. 420 F. Supp. at 1244.
4. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
5. The court cited previous injunctions it had granted based on negligence. 420 F. Supp.
at 1226.
6. Although defined by the Hochfelder Court in the context of that case as "intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud," (425 U.S. at 193) the clear meaning of the term in other
lob-5 litigation remains elusive. See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule lob-5, 67 Nw. L. REv. 562
(1972). Even the Hochfelder Court left open the "question whether, in some circumstances,
reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5," (425 U.S. at
194, n.12). The meaning of scienter where enforcement proceedings are the cause of action
is subject to even greater confusion. Because of the willingness of many courts to employ more
lax standards where prophylactic relief is sought by the SEC, intentional acts are clothed in
raiment bearing the label "negligence." See'discussion beginning on p. 8 infra, on the Second
Circuit's perspective of this issue in injunctive proceedings. See also Campbell, Elements of
Recovery Under Rule l0b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct
Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REv. 653 (1975); Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule IOb-5: Evolution of a Continuum
of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206
(1970). See generally Ruder, Mutiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases, 120 U. PA.
L. REV. 597 (1972).
7. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951). See also Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
8. E.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Shap-
iro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tive suits initiated by the commission have been perceived as pro-
tective of the investing public's interest. Thus they require less re-
strictive parameters than a private action for personal reimburse-
ment.
The Bausch & Lomb court premised its decision on the reason-
ing of Hochfelder. Yet in the latter case the Court declined to con-
sider the precise issue which Judge Ward asserts is controlled by it?
In light of other Second Circuit decisions, therefore, the critical
question presented by the district court'A holding is whether it is
correct in its assertion that a proper reading of Hochfelder makes
its decision compulsory.'"
In the Supreme Court case, the issue was limited to "whether
a private cause of action for damages will lie under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud." In holding that it would not, the
Court relied upon: (1) the language of the statute and the rule; (2)
the legislative history of section 10(b); and (3) a comparison of this
section with other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Act."2
The Court found that the word "manipulative" is a word of art
when used in connection with securities markets, connoting
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud," '
and that the language 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunc-
tion with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest(s) that § 10(b) was
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." '" The
Court refuted the SEC's contention in its amicus brief that the
overall remedial purpose of the Acts supersedes this language by
saying:
The logic of the effect-oriented approach would impose liability
for wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in harm
9. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12: "Since this case concerns an action for damages we ... need
not consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive
relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10-5. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180
(1963)."
10. Another district court has recently applied the Hochfelder rationale to a private
action for injunctive relief, but arguably a private suit is more readily encompassed under
the Hochfelder umbrella than the instant case. Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., 415 F.
Supp. 248 (E.D.Pa. 1976).
11. 425 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).
12. See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.) (Adams,
J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
13. 425 U.S. at 199.
14. !d. at 197.
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to investors .... But apart from where its logic might lead, the
Commission would add a gloss to the operative language of the
statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.'
The court concluded that Congress did not intend that anyone be
made liable for illicit practices unless he had acted other than in
good faith."6 "[W]hen the Commission adopted the Rule it was
intended to apply only to activities that involved scienter."' 7
A literal reading of Hoch[elder then, would seem to support the
district court's conclusion. Additional support may be derived from
the fact that, although Hochfelder had come before the Court as a
private action, the bulk of the opinion was devoted to a refutation
of the SEC's amicus brief which was much concerned with the pol-
icy underlying the rule's implementation. Moreover, although the
Commission had expressed willingness to constrict the degree of
negligence upon which recovery could be predicated to that which
involved foreseeable reliance,'" the Court overrode this option in
preference for the broader, more encompassing requirement of
strictly construed scienter.
Corroboration of the district court's contention that Hochfelder
compelled its decision can be found in Mr. Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent in that case. Decrying the Court's insistence on an allegation
of intent to deceive in 10b-5 actions, he asserted that he perceived
no distinction between private actions and SEC injunctive proceed-
ings.
[Slurely the question whether negligent conduct violates the
Rule should not depend upon the plaintiffs identity. If negli-
gence is a violation factor when the SEC sues, it must be a viola-
tion factor when a private party sues. And, in its present posture,
[summary judgment dismissing the action] this case is con-
cerned with the issue of violation, not with the secondary issue
of a private party's judicially created entitlement to damages or
other specific relief. '"
If Mr. Justice Blackmun is correct, Bausch & Lomb is correct.
The district court's decision to abolish the distinction between
SEC and private actions was made, of course, with full awareness
15. Id. at 198-99.
16. Id. at 206.
17. Id. at 212.
18. Id. at 198 n. 18.
19. Id. at 217-18.
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of the contrary position mantained by the Second Circuit.2 ' Its posi-
tion was that the traditional policy considerations which had pre-
viously distinguished the two kinds of cases were obviated by the
Supreme Court.2" Furthermore, the literal reading of the rule chosen
by the Supreme Court should be imposed even more stringently
upon the Commission than upon private litigants.22
Despite the court's disavowal of policy concerns, beneath the
literalism of its rationale may lie a policy consideration currently
more potent than that disclaimed, a concern for the apprehensi-
veness and uncertainty of the business 'and professional communi-
ties engendered in recent years by the formidable implementation
of Rule 10b-5.23 A review of the relevant literature reveals a surfeit
of commentary on the subject.24 The case law is equally voluminous.
About one-third of all securities cases in recent years were brought
under Rule 10b-5.25
The Bausch & Lomb court devotes disproportionately broad
footnote coverage to circumstances which indicate the paucity of
guidelines available to a corporate official to help him gauge his
conduct in dealing with securities analysts. It chastises the Com-
mission for the use of official disclaimers when staff members pri-
vately offer advice to desperate businessmen." In short, it recog-
20. 420 F. Supp. at 1242-43 n.4.
21. Judge Ward supported his premise by citation to Hochfelder: "As we find the lan-
guage and history of § 10(b) dispositive . . . there is no occasion to examine the additional
considerations of 'policy,' set forth by the parties, ... 425 U.S. 214, n.33, 96 S.Ct. at 1391."
420 F. Supp. at 1241.
22. "The Supreme Court found, 'the language and history of § 10(b) [are] dispositive.'
• . . These stand at least as conclusively when the SEC is plaintiff . . . . If the 'language
and history of § 10(b) [are] dispositive' as to the scienter question in private actions, must
they not also be so in 'SEC suits for injunctions [which] are creatures of statute.' " (citations
omitted). Id. at 1240-41.
23. For a comprehensive collation of pre-1972 cases as well as a superior exposition of
the pertinent considerations in lOb-5 actions, see Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting) (table of relevant cases at 312
-16), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) See also Bucklo, supra note 6.
24. It is interesting to note the repeated references discerned in these writings to the
SEC's "arsenal" of flexible enforcement powers. (See, e.g., Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195; Note,
-Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule lOb-5, 74 YALE L. J. 658, 659 (1965). The images
of weaponry the word evokes are particularly frightening in this era of agency disrepute.
25. Note, Liability of Controlling Persons-Common Law and Statutory Theories of
Secondary Liability, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 621, n.4. See also Ruder, supra note 6, at 598, n. 1.
26. "In the absence of official pronouncements on a topic of considerable. concern, how-
ever, it ill behooves the Commission . . . to assert that remarks made by its 'insiders' will




nizes the hapless dilemma of honorable people who cannot predict
what effect any comment they may make will have on their reputa-
tions and careers should the heavy hand of the SEC be laid upon
them for reasons they cannot foresee.27
A valid argument has been proferred that use of a negligence
standard in SEC injunctive actions under 10b-5(b) results in pre-
cisely the opposite effect from that desired. "[T]he sought-after
goal of a free flow of corporate information might be discouraged
rather than encouraged. The pragmatic rule might well become,
'when in doubt, say as little as possible.""'2 It seems an eminently
reasonable supposition that this consideration underlay the district
court's holding as influentially as the literally applied rationale of
Hoch/elder.
The profusion of 10b-5 litigation in recent years also may have
influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder.2" A number
of contemporary Supreme Court decisions seem to indicate a gener-
ally restrictive attitude on the part of the Court where securities law
litigation is involved.30 Although lower courts need not be presumed
to adhere to a similar point of view, Bausch & Lomb may be a
reflection of an incipient turn-around in the attitude of the judiciary
as to what segment of the investment community most needs pro-
27. See generally Loss, Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAW. 163 (Special Issue March 1975).
28. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 287 (3d Cir. 1972).
29. A memorandum to staff attorneys by the SEC's general counsel noted that recent
cases evidence a trend in the Supreme Court to limit access by private parties to the federal
courts. Of course, the SEC feels this restrictive attitude does not apply to Commission
instituted suits. SEC General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) (May 26, 1976, F-1, F-2).
30. See Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus.
LAW. 883 (1976). The author remarks:
Heretofore, in rule 10b-5 matters, I used to take as my premise ...Painter's
witty insight that rule 10b-5 was like the medieval alchemist's 'universal solvent'
which was so potent that it dissolved every container employed to hold it ....
Now, the Supreme Court's .. .attitude seems to hint that the Court may have
an alchemy of its own for the containment of rule 10b-5 which it will from time
to time disclose.
Id. at 895-96
Kaplan points to the court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps Co. v. Manor Drug Co., 421
U.S.723 (1975), as the seminal case in revealing the Court's braking process, saying the
opinion resembles "a proclamation ... to the inferior federal courts, urging more restrictive
interpretations of rule 10b-5 and possibly of the Securities Act in general." 31 Bus. LAW. at
896. Had Hochfelder been handed down when his article was written, he might have pointed
to it as the apex of an already formidable configuration. Compare with SEC General Coun-
sel's Memorandum, supra note 29 at F-2.
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tection in light of the uncertain atmosphere of the corporate envi-
ronment vis-a-vis prospective litigation.
Other cases in which the Second Circuit has dealt with the
question of the correct standard of culpability to be applied in SEC
injunctive actions need not be dispositive of the endurance of
Bausch & Lomb's holding. But of course, they bear pertinently on
how receptive the circuit court will be to accepting Judge Ward's
insistence that his decision was a compulsory one. Often, the broad
language employed by this circuit has belied the factual underpin-
nings of the cases in which the language was uttered.
The reasoning of the Bausch & Lomb court may be acceptable
to the Second Circuit for the precise reason asserted by Judge
Ward-because it is compelled by Hochfelder. Yet since the Su-
preme Court officially left the question open, it is more reasonable
to assume that the Second Circuit will adhere to previously declared
principles if they cannot be reconciled with Bausch & Lomb's inter-
pretation of Hochfelder. It is the contention of this writer that such
a reconciliation can be affected, although not without compromise,
and that the language of the cases provides the basis upon which to
build this accord. Even if outright intent to deceive is not the ulti-
mate test decided upon, willful disregard may provide the preferred
standard for injunctive actions. This at least is more acceptable
than the negligence standards so loosely articulated in the past.
Despite repeated assertions that SEC injunctive actions stand
on a different footing from private suits with respect to the requisite
standard of behavior, all of the Second Circuit cases have required,
at a minimum, an allegation of actual knowledge or willful omis-
sion. Injunctions have not been ordered in situations where a defen-
dant's lack of actual knowledge was shown or where his failure to
inquire was deemed excusable."
The penultimate 10b-5 case in the Second Circuit is surely SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.32 Briefly, the case involved the issuance of
a misleading press release regarding the importance of a newly dis-
covered mineral deposit, and insider trading on the basis of knowl-
edge not accessible to the general public. The main opinion ex-
31. See generally Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.) cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Bucklo, supra, note 6, at 596; Mann, supra, note 6, at 1208;
Comment, Scienter & Rule lOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1066 (1969), and cases discussed
infra.
32. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
[Vol. 31:1524
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pressed a version of the scienter requirement with which only four
judges agreed. In language unduly ambiguous, Judge Waterman
stated:
[W]hether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC enforce-
ment proceeding or as a private action, proof of a specific intent
to defraud is unnecessary. In an enforcement proceeding for equi-
table or prophylactic relief, the common law standard of decep-
tive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader protec-
tion for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct ha
become unlawful.'
He went on to flesh out his opinion, saying: "Absent any clear
indication of a legislative intention to require a showing of specific
fraudulent intent ...the securities laws should be interpreted as
an expansion of the common law both to effectuate the broad reme-
dial design of Congress ... and to ensure uniformity of enforcement
''34
It is precisely this void (absence of a showing of legislative
intent) which Hochfelder has filled by its definitive interpretation
of legislative intent. The approach of the Bausch & Lomb court is
strengthened by retrospective examination of Judge Waterman's
opinion. It fairly may be said that Texas Gulf Sulfur's loosely con-
strued negligence standard no longer remains viable even in SEC
enforcement actions.
In his widely quoted concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
Judge Friendly stated his reservations regarding the negligence
standard applied in the majority opinion. He pointed out that such
a standard is likely to frustrate, not further, the larger goals of the
securities laws, and asserted that even where injunctive sanctions
are at issue, it can be argued that "Rule- 10b-5(2), absent the reading
in of a scienter requirement, goes beyond the authority granted by
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act."35
Hard on the heels of its Texas Gulf Sulfur decision, the Second
Circuit decided SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc." The SEC
sought a preliminary injunction because of omissions in press re-
leases and 8-K reports37 and because of failure to disclose unusually
33. Id. at 854-55 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 868.
36. 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.920 (1969).
37. "8-K reports" are annual reports required to be filed by certain issuers of registered
19771
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high finder's fees in the acquisition of mining properties. Despite his
statement that inadvertence and prompt correction do not defeat
the SEC's right to injunctive relief, " Judge Friendly, speaking for
the majority, observed: "The evidence ... compelled a finding that
the deficiencies in the press releases and reports were not merely
negligent . . . but something more.""9 As to the failure to disclose
that large finder's fees were to be paid in connection with the pur-
chase of property by Great American, the court allowed the injunc-
tion only where actual knowledge by the corporate purchaser was
shown. The decision did not rest on some nebulous concept of unde-
fined duty, but on a continuing course of deception or omission.
In SEC v. Frank, 10. the SEC sought to restrain an attorney from
drafting allegedly misleading documents describing a chemical
product. Scienter was not directly at issue, and the injunction was
dissolved on other grounds, but Judge Friendly indicated that an
attorney would not be liable for negligence in a field where his
expertise was not directly relevant to the function he performed (the
attorney was translating technical language into more understanda-
ble terms). The judge implied, however, that recklessness would be
equivalent to willful deception from which intent could be inferred.
Hanly v. SEC"' was an SEC enforcement action which resulted
in the barring of securities brokers from practicing because of willful
and deliberate misrepresentations. Though the court adverted to
the loose standard of negligence set forth in Texas Gulf Sulfur, it
actually predicated its approval of the injunction on the deliberately
deceptive conduct of the individuals censured.
In SEC v. Manror Nursing Centers, Inc.42 the Commission sued
for both injunctive and ancillary relief (disgorgement) against de-
fendants who had promised to return investors' money if their total
offering of stock was not purchased. Although the offering was not
completely sold out, defendants kept the funds. While most of the
defendants had acted with scienter sufficient to meet the stringent
definition later to be set forth in Hochfelder, three were less culpa-
securities, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-11, .15d-11 (1976). The 8-K report is required to be filed upon
the happening of certain events, including the acquisition of substantial assets not in the
ordinary course of the issuer's business. Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1976).
38. 407 F.2d at 457.
39. Id. at 458.
40. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
42. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ble than the others. Their error had been failure to exercise diligent
inquiry when stop payments had been issued on their original
checks and the second checks came from the corporation rather than
a buyer, events which the court said should have alerted them that
something was amiss.
This case involved a violation of Rule 10b-941: rather than 10b-
5, a significant difference. The language of 10b-9 deals specifically
with "all or nothing" offerings and even these defendants were
found to have "deliberately closed their eyes to facts which they, as
selling shareholders who were to receive a substantial financial ben-
efit, were under a duty to see . . . . "1 Even though a negligence
standard was applied, there had existed an element of profiteering
in a continuing course of conduct at the expense of the investing
public. Thus "negligence" in this circumstance might well be re-
garded as a label for more culpable behavior.
In 1973, the Second Circuit handed down its opinion in SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd.4" The Commission sought a preliminary injunction
against an attorney who had prepared an opinion letter used to
facilitate the sale of unregistered securities. In remanding the case
for an evidentiary hearing, Judge Kaufman rejected the "actual
knowledge" standard utilized by the district court, alluding to it as
"a sharp and unjustified departure from the negligence standard
which we have repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of
enforcement proceedings ...."" Despite this broad language, Judge
Kaufman made it clear that he utilized these words in the context
of a proceeding against a knowledgeable professional to whom a
particularly stringent measure of diligence applied. The standard of
culpability appropriate in such a situation was not to be applied to
more peripheral participants in an illicit scheme. The court empha-
sized in a later case47 its intention that it be clearly understood that
the crucial element in Spectrum had been that the defendant's
responsibility "be measured by the appropriate standard of negli-
gence, that is, the defendant should have been able to conclude that
his act was likely to be used in furtherance of illegal activity."4
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1976).
44. 458 F.2d at 1097 (emphasis added).
45. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 541.
47. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 811.
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Once again it seems clear that "something more" than ordinary
negligence was the true principle by which defendant's acts were
measured. The expressed generality belied the facts.
The circuit court, in SEC v. Shapiro,4" approved injunctive
sanctions against another knowledgeable professional (a specialist
in corporate mergers) for repeated trading on the basis of material
inside information which he knew was not available to the public.
Although the court stated that it was not necessary to show bad
faith where the SEC seeks injunctive relief, it noted that the lower
court had found the individual to have exhibited "driving cupidity
and lack of principle and restraint." '
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc." is notable for its thought-
ful discussion of the circumstances under which the granting of a
Commission-sought injunction is appropriate. The case involved
two facets of alleged misbehavior: deliberate manipulative actions
in the corporation's unregistered stock by a director who was also
an experienced securities lawyer, and shady maneuvers engaged in
by brokers in order to give an appearance of activity in the stock and
thereby raise its price. While theoretically adhering to the negli-
gence standard expressed in Texas Gulf Sulfur, the court refused to
enjoin non-volitional violations of the securities laws, and indeed
warned the judiciary not to "set aside all notions of fairness because
it is the SEC, rather than a private litigant, which has stepped into
court." 2
Fundamental to the approach taken by the Management
Dynamics court was the concept that the Commission appeared as
the protector of the public interest, and "the standards of the public
interest, not the requirements of private litigation measure the pro-
priety and need for injunctive relief.""3 This concept was referred to
once again in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc.54 (involving, inter alia, a
brokerage house's liability for the acts of its employees), but the
court determined that the damage that would be done by enjoining
a brokerage house outweighed even these higher standards.
Two relevant cases have been decided by the Second Circuit
49. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
50. Id. at 1308.
51. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 808.
53. Id., quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944).
54. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 31:1524
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since the district court rendered its decision in Bausch & Lomb. In
the first, Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC,55 the court was called upon
to review a harsh penalty imposed upon an over the counter broker
in an SEC administrative proceeding, The defendant was found to
have willfully aided and abetted a violation of Rule 10b-5 by impro-
perly rebating a portion of his commissions on transactions emanat-
ing from the IOS debace of recent years." In reducing the penalty
imposed by the Commission, the court adverted to the issue of
scienter. The question of an appropriate standard of culpability
arose in the context of Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.17 This section authorizes the SEC to invoke specified penalties
against a broker or dealer for a number of infractions including
willful violation of any rule imposed under the Act. Thus violation
of Rule 10b-5 is punishable by the Commission under section 15. For
years, courts have held that willfulness under section 15 meant
merely intentional commission of the act which constitutes the vio-
lation. There was no requirement of evil motive or of intent to vio-
late the law.5
Defendant argued that Hochfelder's scienter requirement was
applicable in this situation. The court agreed with this argument
and assumed without deciding that the Hochfelder standard applies
in disciplinary proceedings. Judge Friendly, speaking for the court,
used the opportunity the case afforded to clarify the approach the
court will take in delimiting scienter.
He stated that since the Hochfelder plaintiffs "had claimed
nothing more than negligence, the [Supreme] Court had no occa-
sion to refine its definition of scienter . .. and [left] open the
question whether reckless behavior would suffice to meet [the test]
... , He then found that Hochfelder was no help to this defend-
ant. Any transgression against the exhortation, "Thou shalt not
devise any other cunning devices," is sufficient to satisfy the scien-
55. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. This "debacle" came about through the collapse of IOS Ltd., a Canadian financial
service firm engaged principally with the investment of off-shore funds in the United States.
Litigation resulting from the collapse includes at least three United States Courts of Appeals
cases.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970) (amended in part 15 U.S.C. § 780 (Supp. V 1975)).
58. Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C.
Cir. 1949). See also 2 Loss, SEcURrIEs REGULATION 1309 (1961).
59. 547 F.2d at 180-81.
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ter requirement under this interpretation of scienter, whether or not
defendant knows that the "cunning device" employed is a fraud."'
This case was not an injunctive proceeding, and thus cannot be
directly helpful in predicting what conclusions the Second Circuit
will reach in deciding Bausch & Lomb on appeal. Indeed, the court
alluded to the difference between injunctive proceedings, "the
objective of which is solely to prevent threatened future harm," and
disciplinary actions, which it felt were more closely akin in the
seriousness of their consequences, to private damage actions."' But
it does indicate that scienter can be construed to include reckless
behavior,62 and it does show a willingness on the part of the Second
Circuit to extend Hochfelder beyond the parameters of private dam-
age actions. It is submitted that a definition of scienter which em-
braces reckless behavior is a possible first step in applying the
Hochfelder rationale to SEC initiated injunctive suits.
On December 16, 1976, about a week after Lipper was decided,
the Second Circuit handed down its opinion in SEC v. Universal
Major Industries, Corp. 63 Although the action was not brought under
Rule 10b-5, it is pertinent to the issue of the scienter requirement
in injunctive actions. An attorney Was convicted of aiding and abet-
ting the corporation in selling unregistered securities in violation of
section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.64 He had written opinion
letters in carefully qualified language which the court found to have
given purchasers misleading assurances that the sale was legal.
The pronouncements in the decision, like those in several pre-
viously discussed cases, contain broad assertions, readily embraced
by facile interpreters to substantiate propositions not warranted by
a careful review of modifying language in the same opinion. The
court noted that it did "not believe the Supreme Court [in
Hochfelder] intended that those who play an indispensable role in
the sale . . . should not be subject to SEC initiated, injunctive
restraint."6 It added: "[In SEC proceedings seeking equitable
relief, a cause of action may be predicated upon negligence alone,
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 180.
62. Cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
63. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Section 5 makes it unlawful, directly or indirectly, to sell
unregistered stock.
65. 546 F.2d at 1046.
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and scienter is not required. While this rule has not met with univer-
sal approval ... it is nonetheless the law of this Circuit."
66
Although this was not a 10b-5 case, this language, if read alone,
would lead one to assume that Bausch & Lomb must fall. Yet these
words were modified by a footnote in which the court said: "In any
event, the District Court's finding that appellant acted with
'knowledge or reckless disregard of truth' removes the props from
under appellant's basic argument." 7 Moreover, returning to the
text of the opinion, the court stated:
[O]ur decision need not rest on our rejection of appellant's
negligence-scienter argument, because the District Court found
that appellant in some circumstances knew and in other circum-
stances had reason to know that his client was engaging in illegal
transactions with the aid of appellant's letters and that appel-
lant's acts were performed with knowledge or reckless disregard
of the truth. This ... is sufficient to establish scienter
8
Once again the bald assertion that negligence suffices in SEC
initiated injunctive actions was accompanied only peripherally by
clarifying observations. A more definitive statement of the outside
limits of what constitutes sufficient "negligence" in such cases must
be advanced so that time-wasting, expensive litigation can be
avoided. It is suggested that what has been at issue in those cases
in which culpability has been found is not. really negligence at all,
but such willful conduct as may properly be classified beneath the
umbrella of scienter as defined by Judge Friendly in Lipper. A clear
pronouncement of this fact is sorely needed.
Because of the Second Circuit's assertion in Universal Major
that an SEC injunctive action may be predicated upon negligence
alone, the Commission, in January 1977, moved for an unusual
"summary reversal" of the Bausch & Lomb decision. In February,
the circuit court denied the Commission's motion." The opportun-
ity remains open to the Second Circuit to clarify, in precise terms,
just what kind of behavior is sufficiently culpable to justify injunc-
tive sanction.
66. Id. at 1047 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. n.1.
68. Id.
69. See Kohn, SEC Loses Bid for Remand of Bausch & Lomb Ruling, New York Law
Journal, Feb. 9, 1977 at 1, col. 3. The court offered the commission an expedited appeal, but
the SEC refused.
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It is apparent that the Second Circuit has steadfastly adhered
to a position which seems at odds with Bausch & Lom b's contention
that literalism must overwhelm policy if the rationale of Hochfelder
is to be followed. A satisfactory compromise need not be an illusion
in spite of the visible dichotomy. Although it is unlikely that the
Second Circuit will desert its policy position altogether, nothing in
its prior holdings need preclude the application of a new approach
which defines scienter so as to encompass willful disregard of the
public interest and requires that scienter, as thus construed, be
pleaded and proven in an injunctive action brought by the SEC.
Since the defendants in Bausch & Lomb clearly did not intend to
engage in deceptive or manipulative activities, it would be perfectly
consistent with both the policy and the actuality of prior Second
Circuit holdings for this case to serve as the vehicle for a re-
definition of the standard of culpability required in SEC injunctive
suits. The exhortation in Management Dynamics that fairness must
not be forgotten merely because the SEC is the plaintiff can be
implemented by such a re-definition.
Since 1974 the Sixth Circuit has held that in injunctive pro-
ceedings under 10b-5(2), the SEC must show at least "willful or
reckless disregard for truth."" Yet the opposite perspective remains
viable. Subsequent to the Bausch & Lomb decision, a district court
in California ruled that for the limited purposes of that case, proof
of scienter was not necessary in an SEC enforcement action.', The
Second Circuit itself has reasserted this position, and the First Cir-
cuit has recently ruled that Hochfelder only applies to private dam-
age suits for past actions."
In SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc."' the First Circuit faced a
situation in which a religious organization not only had failed to
reveal its shaky financial status while offering securities, but had
70. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
(Even if investment of state funds in corporate notes was illegal, no violations of the securities
laws would be found if defendants acted without intent to deceive, as measured by a standard
of reckless disregard for truth.)
71. SEC v. Geotek, [1976] FED. SEC. L. Rav. (CCH) 95,756 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 1976).
It is noteworthy that the court stressed that it had adopted the negligence standard for the
purpose of that case only, since defendants were not even found negligent. It is arguable that
if a clearer standard, e.g., the Hochfelder scienter requirement, were adopted for SEC injunc-
tive actions, a more efficient use of tax dollars might be encouraged, for such suits as this
one would not be brought.




evidenced its intentions of continuing practices which the court
found deceptive. The SEC did not press the scienter issue. For
understandable reasons it chose to regard it as immaterial."4 Yet
Judge Aldrich, speaking for the court, ruled:
From the standpoint of an SEC injunction against violations
which the court finds are likely to persist, a defendant's state of
mind is irrelkvant. If proposed conduct is objectively within the
Congressional definition of injurious to the public, good faith,
however, much it may be a defense to a private suit for past
actions .... should make no difference.75
The court did add that prior adjudication had already evi-
denced defendant's intent to commit acts which a federal court had
found deceptive, but this deference to logical thinking does not
eliminate the court's unwillingness to demand a finding of intent to
deceive prior to issuance of an injunction. The Second Circuit has
observed that the degree of scienter may "be highly relevant to a
determination of whether the defendant has a propensity to commit
future violations, a requisite to injunctive relief."" If Judge Aldrich
in World Radio Mission had asserted only that, after the fact has
been found that violations are likely to persist, state of mind be-
comes inconsequential, no objection would lie. But instead, he chose
to proclaim Hochfelder irrelevant to SEC injunctive suits. The ini-
tial detemination of likely recurrence, a sine qua non of injunctive
proceedings, cannot be made in the absence of consideration given
to the state of mind of the defendant. While scienter may not be the
preeminent consideration in injunctive proceedings, this position is
reserved for consideration of the likelihood of recurrence. It is a vital
prerequisite to the determination of whether an injunction should
issue at all.
It makes little sense to enjoin behavior which is merely negli-
gent under the banner of a statute which is directed against fraudu-
lent behavior. Where negligence alone exists, the SEC has adminis-
trative procedures at its disposal which better serve both the negli-
gent individual and the investment community.
The consequences of an injunction are not lightly borne. It must
74. See SEC General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 29, at F-3.
75. 544 F.2d at 540.
76. SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973). The Court, however, rejected
the scienter standard and accepted the negligence standard.
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be reported on government forms, and it can lead to disbarment or
compulsory resignation from federally-funded employment.1
7 It
places individuals in permanent jeopardy of criminal sanctions for
future violations. 7 Although SEC injunctive actions will have no res
judicata effect if subsequent private actions should ensue 71, the mere
existence of an injunction may motivate vexatious would-be liti-
gants to harass enjoined corporations with threats of private suits
for their settlement value alone.s
To predicate such perils on non-willful behavior is a restriction
of freedom of action which smacks of totalitarianism. Moreover, if
a corporation has been subjected to injunctive imprimatur, its
stockholders-the very people who were intended to be among the
beneficiaries of the law's protections-may ultimately pay the price
of corporate disrepute in lowered stock values. To impose such con-
sequences on the basis of a section of the law under which no defini-
tive standards of acceptable conduct exist (What may one safely
divulge to a securities analyst? What are the parameters of an ac-
ceptable press release about a newly discovered mineral deposit?
When does a prospective merger become sufficiently definite to re-
quire divulgence?) is to ask too much of any citizen. In balancing
the hardships imposed against the benefits accrued, the negligence
standard emerges wanting.
Having considered the logic of Bausch & Lomb in the light of
Hochfelder, the background of the case law in the Second Circuit
and the conflicts among the courts, it remains to reflect upon the
likely attitude of the Commission itself. Armed with the recent
decisions in SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.' and SEC v.
World Radio Mission8 2 plus the Supreme Court's non-inclusion of
injunctive actions within the necessary constraints of Hoch[elder
the Commission may be expected to assert that a private damage
action is "significantly distinguishable from Commission actions.""s
In so doing it wields the sword of prior Second Circuit holdings
which support this position. It may argue that where damages are
77. 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 473 (1976).
78. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 888 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore, J. dissenting),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
79. SEC v. Standard Life Corp., 413 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
80. See Blue Chip Stamp Co. v. Manor Drug Co., 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
81. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
82. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
83. SEC General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 29, at F-2.
1540 [Vol. 31:1524
involved, private parties often come before the courts with suits
which are merely vexatious. To this situation it would contrast its
protective btance and assert that its prophylactic actions are di-
rected toward the prevention of future violations while suits for
damages are based on past violations."4 It may, in appropriate situa-
tions, argue that "it is not necessary in order to obtain an injunction
that we establish a past violation of the law." 5 In refutation of this
argument, it has already been noted that scienter is inextricably
involved with the likelihood of future violations. When due regard
is given to the possible consequences of the imposition of injunctive
sanctions on a merely negligent defendant, such assertions should
be overcome.
The Commission also is likely to rely on SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc. 6 cited in Hochfelder,7 for the proposition
that "it is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief
to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary dam-
ages."" This case was decided over a decade ago by a different
Court. Moreover, as pointed out by Judge Adams' concurring opin-
ion in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.:
There is nothing in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc.
(citation omitted) indicating that proof of fraud is an obsolete
requirement. The Government there sought an injunction under
the* Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which contains language
similar to that found in Section 10(b), to compel a registered
investment advisor to disclose to its customers its practice of
purchasing securities, recommending purchases of those securi-
ties by the subscribers to the service, and then selling the securi-
ties at a profit .... The Supreme Court based its holding on the
fiduciary relationship existing between an advisor and his client.... Capital Gains Research Bureau can be read as expanding
the scope of Section 10(b) by including in the requirement of
fraud the concept of constructive fraud, but it in no way elimi-
nates the requirement altogether. 9
Thus this argument too, is refutable.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
87. See discussion in note 9, supra.
88. 375 U.S. at 193.
89. 458 F.2d 255, 282 (Adams, J. concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
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If all else fails, the Commission may be expected to advert to
the fact that Hochfelder merely required that some element of scien-
ter be shown, and fall back on the standard of recklessness as suffi-
cient." It is this position which is likely to be acceptable to the
Second Circuit, for it affords reasonable middle ground upon which
to compromise.
As a final matter, the General Counsel's office recommends to
SEC staffers that "whenever possible" they include allegations of
violations of statutory provisions and rules additional to section
10(b) and 10b-5. 11 Other commentators have noted the likelihood
that such eventuations would be forthcoming, 2 and it seems reason-
able to expect that this will be so. As 10b-5 actions diminish in
number, suits brought under other sections of the securities laws are
likely to proliferate.
Bausch & Lomb is correct in asserting that a proper reading of
Hochfelder compels some form of scienter to be pleaded and proven
by the SEC as well as by private plaintiffs in any action brought
under the aegis of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This position is
supported by: (1) The rationale of Hochfelder; (2) Mr. Justice
Blackmun's correct observations that the plaintiff's identity should
not determine the violation factor; (3) a perceivable Supreme Court
policy of restrictive enforcement of 10b-5 actions; (4) the likelihood
that a negligence standard effectively constricts rather than en-
larges the free flow of information; (5) the preventive rather than
punitive nature of injunctive relief; and (6) the possibly profound
consequences of the imposition of an injunction on the individuals
and corporations involved. Because it philosophically supports the
prophylactic functions of Commission injunctive suits, the Second
Circuit is unlikely to accept Bausch & Lomb's ruling without collat-
eral reformation of the concept of scienter. Therefore, the true im-
pact of the decision is likely to be its influence on the interpretation
the circuit court gives to the words "intent to deceive, manipulate
or defraud" in the context of Commission injunctive actions.
At the least, it is to be hoped that the theoretical invocation of
a broad negligence standard will be eliminated, and in its stead the
court will adopt a clearly defined, modified concept of scienter for
90. SEC General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 29, at F-2.
91. Id. at F-3.
92. See, e.g., Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and
How it Compares with Rule lOb-5, 13 Hous. L. REV. 231 (1976).
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SEC injunctive suits. A definition of intent which draws the bottom
line at willful disregard of truth, or reckless disdain for the public
interest is not inappropriate, for intent to deceive can fairly be
interpolated from such acts. The Second Circuit has already pro-
mulgated such a definition in Universal Major. The standard should
always be applied with reference to a particular defendant's degree
of responsibility. An injunction should not issue in the absence of
actual knowledge that the statement or omission was false or decep-
tive, 3 unless evidence is adduced that there is likelihood of a future
willful violation. Despite prior pronouncements to the contrary by
the Second Circuit, good faith should be a defense to an attempted
SEC injunction, lest the injunctive process appear punitive rather
than preventive.
Such parameters accommodate the two relevant policy con-
cerns: protection of the individual investor and recognition of the
realities of the business world. They adhere to the spirit of
Hochfelder if not to its letter. They in no way impair the efficacy of
the Commission as the public's watchdog in financial matters. Re-
strained intervention is both more efficient and more effective than
excessive zeal to protect the entire investment community.
JOAN M. BOLOTIN
93. See Comment, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1080-81 (1969).
Compare SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), in which an "actual knowledge"
standard was rejected, with SEC v. Great Am. Ind., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), where
an injunction was approved only when actual knowledge of omitted facts was shown.
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